Presunta toma de más de 50 sitios web venezolanos atribuida a GlorySec

What this source supports

• Daily Dark Web published a GlorySec-attributed claim of seizing more than 50 Venezuelan websites under #OPVenezuela
• the article visible list contains exactly 43 names despite calling it comprehensive and saying more than 50
• the article attributes offline status and a 48-hour threat to publish recovered data to GlorySec
• the article does not independently validate any target, access, modification, outage or data recovery

Evidence limits

Secondary publication of an actor-attributed campaign statement. Its “over 50” count is not reconciled with the 43 visible names, and it provides no primary post, independent victim statement, per-site artifact, archive or telemetry.

Relevance to this case

Strongest detailed record of the exact May 2024 aggregate claim and visible target list; evidence of publication, not of the claimed compromises.

What this source supports

• Check Point documents a renewed post-election #OpVenezuela campaign beginning after 28 July 2024
• the article attributes a later Venezuelan Communist Party account claim to GlorySec
• the article does not mention or corroborate the May claim about 50 or more private websites

Evidence limits

Authoritative secondary research for the later campaign phase, but temporally and substantively separate from this May aggregate claim.

Relevance to this case

Retained only to distinguish a later reuse of #OpVenezuela and prevent its evidence from being misapplied to the May claim.

What this source supports

• SOCRadar profiles GlorySec as a hacktivist group whose claims include defacement, DDoS, leaks and access
• the profile says the group shifted focus toward Venezuela and emphasizes defacement
• the profile explicitly cautions that assertive claims may be inaccurate
• the page does not identify or validate the May 50-site campaign

Evidence limits

A later general profile based heavily on the group public channels. It provides actor context, not independent campaign attribution or incident confirmation.

Relevance to this case

Retained as claim-aware actor context only; it cannot support the May count, target list or technical impact.

What this source supports

• the exact post says GlorySec seized more than 50 Venezuelan websites under #OPVenezuela
• the post links the Daily Dark Web article
• the post documents the publisher circulation of the claim rather than independent verification

Evidence limits

This exact post and the article are the same publisher/claim family, not two independent confirmations. The attached actor-branded aggregate art contains no technical or per-target validation.

Relevance to this case

Exact contemporaneous social publication of the aggregate claim and date; not proof that any site was compromised.

What this source supports

• page 5 says GlorySec gained access to 50 websites of various Venezuelan companies during #OPVenezuela
• the PDF independently publishes the campaign claim and number 50 within the same reporting week
• the report supplies no target list, primary claimant reference, technical artifact or access validation

Evidence limits

Professional secondary reporting but no cited primary post, target detail, telemetry or methodology. It corroborates publication of the claim, not actual access to 50 sites.

Relevance to this case

Added as the only independent professional publication found for the contemporaneous 50-site campaign claim.